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Abstract 
While dependence is a well-known concern in IS outsourcing, there is little literature 
dealing with this phenomenon as proposed by traditional dependence research in other 
disciplines. In particular, little efforts have been made to contrast a client’s dependence 
with supplier’s dependence in a single study. To bring forward the conceptualization in 
our field, we investigated five outsourcing relationships with respect to dependence 
structures in a dyad. Perceptual differences became apparent while comparing clients’ 
perceived dependencies with suppliers’ ones. As a second contribution we aimed to 
explain different client positions in the dependence structures. Therefore, the 
dependence construct was broken down into its constituting facets. Besides importance 
of the outsourcing relationship and a supplier’s substitutability, spillover effects 
emerged as an unanticipated third category of dependence. Originating from other 
exchange relationships with the same partner, these effects can distort the dependence 
structure in the focal relationship. Implications for future research are discussed. 
Keywords: Outsourcing relationships, information systems, dependence, power, dyadic, 
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Introduction 
Today, many client companies have to a large extent outsourced their information systems (IS) to 
specialized IT suppliers. Since the early beginnings of IS outsourcing research, an excessive dependence 
on suppliers is perceived as a main risk for client companies (Gonzalez et al. 2005; Lacity et al. 2009). The 
concerns of being unable to switch to another IT supplier or subjected to a dictate of pricing, are only two 
of the aspects that clients associate with a strong dependence in IS outsourcing relationships. Compared 
to dependence research in other disciplines, investigations of dependence in IS outsourcing are, however, 
still in the early stages. 
In other research disciplines, dependence has been identified as an essential attribute of a relationship 
between two or more organizations (Emerson 1962). Traditional dependence literature suggests to assess 
both, client and supplier dependence, i.e., taking a dyadic perspective, in order to draw adequate 
conclusions (Emerson 1962). The reason behind it is that the aspired power advantage by one party arises 
from a dependence asymmetry, i.e., the difference between the two organizations’ dependencies (Emerson 
1962). The opportunity to exercise such a power potential in an unbalanced dependence structure, 
represents a threat for the weaker party’s business performance (e.g., Gulati and Sytch 2007; Lacity et al. 
2009). For example, a more powerful position of the supplier might induce lower service quality to the 
detriment of the client. On the other side, supplier performance losses appear when a more powerful 
client bullies its supplier and puts pressure on prices. 
Losing sight of managing organizational dependencies, companies expose themselves to opportunistic 
behavior by their exchange partners or they fail to reap benefits by remaining in a disadvantageous 
dependence position. An understanding of dyadic dependencies enriches the stream of literature 
regarding the successful management of client-supplier relationships. Given the fact that IS outsourcing 
research has up to now treated this concept quite superficially, as will be outlined below, we focus on two 
main contributions: First, an extension of existing IS outsourcing relationship research by adopting the 
dyadic concept of dependence from other disciplines. This step will provide valuable conceptual and 
empirical insights which could not been obtained when addressing only one side of the dyad. Second, a 
comprehensive conceptualization of client dependence, paying attention to the peculiarities of the IS 
outsourcing domain. As a complex construct, dependence is determined by various factors which prior 
research has not clearly differentiated. The conceptual work presented herein will prove useful in future 
studies to explain, e.g., a) levels of perceived dependence, b) why companies remain in suboptimal 
relationships, c) differences in the levels of mutual trust and commitment to a relationship, as well as 
occurrence of conflicts and coercive strategies, which are assumed to influence d) relationship quality and 
IS outsourcing success. 
This paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the topic of dyadic dependencies, refers to 
dependence research and theoretical frameworks. In the third section, the chosen research approach is 
described. Subsequently, we propose a framework of dependence determinants and present findings for 
five client-supplier relationships in IS development/maintenance outsourcing. This article closes with a 
discussion of findings, limitations and possible directions for future research. 
Theoretical Background 
Dyadic Dependencies in Exchange Relationships 
Contrary to IS outsourcing research, dyadic dependencies have received greater attention in supply 
management and relationship marketing literature (Frazier 1983; Kumar et al. 1995; Palmatier et al. 
2007). Many contributions in this field have been inspired by the seminal work of Emerson (1962), who 
illustrated that the concepts of dependence and power are strongly interlinked: “The power of A over B is 
equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A”. Many researchers have built on Emerson’s 
dependence conceptualization, in which each party’s dependence is determined by (1) the importance of 
the relationship to achieve desired goals and (2) the extent to which there are alternatives to achieve these 
goals. Studies based on this view usually adopt a pluralist perspective, in which involved parties pursue 
differing objectives and power is a party’s ability to influence other’s behaviors (Jasperson et al. 2002). 
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Investigations of the dyadic nature of dependence is very popular in these disciplines and has led to the 
distinction of two constructs, namely joint dependence, or the sum of two organizations’ dependencies on 
each other, and relative dependence, i.e., the difference in the dependencies as described above (e.g., 
Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). Researchers have used them to measure the impact of dependence on e.g., 
relationship quality and the involved partners’ performances in an exchange relationship (e.g., Palmatier 
et al. 2007). In a high joint dependence structure, i.e., both partners are highly dependent on each other, 
both face high exit barriers and can cause serious damage to each other. Thus, due to the mutual desire to 
maintain and perhaps further deepen the relationship, such dependence combinations usually show 
positive outcomes reflected in e.g., higher levels of joint action, commitment and trust (e.g., Gulati and 
Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). In contrast, dependence asymmetry has been shown to lead to decreasing 
trust and commitment as well as increasing conflict (Kumar et al. 1995). Diverging interests, opportunistic 
behavior and coercive use of power are more likely in asymmetric relationships and proved aversive to the 
development of relationship quality. 
Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
Turning to IS outsourcing, here understood as a “business practice in which a company contracts all or 
part of its information systems operations to one or more outside information service suppliers” (Hu et al. 
1997), a different picture emerges. Prior research has acknowledged that dependence pertains to the 
‘behavioral dimension’ (Currie and Willcocks 1998; Kern and Willcocks 2000) or to the ‘attributes’ (Goles 
et al. 2005) pervading the working atmosphere of an IS outsourcing relationship. Surprisingly, apart from 
studies that mention the term ‘dependence’, mostly to refer to it as a risk for the client (e.g., Aubert et al. 
2005; Gonzalez et al. 2005), literature is largely silent about its dyadic nature and its specific effects on 
outsourcing relationships. 
Some exceptions, predominantly case-based research, lead us to assume that organizational dependence 
is highly relevant throughout the whole lifecycle of an IS outsourcing relationship. By signing the 
outsourcing contract, a specific dependence setting is initialized, albeit quite often still on a small scale. 
Various factors usually lead to a change in dependencies over time. In the service delivery phase, 
dependencies are likely to influence the efforts put into the relationship, stipulating power-play and 
influencing relationship  outcomes. For example, in an experimental setting, Swinarski et al. (2004) found 
a positive relationship between a client’s power, i.e., a supplier’s dependence on the client, on its 
motivation to comply with contractual obligations, its willingness to cooperate and to invest additional 
resources in the relationship (Swinarski et al. 2004). A similar study investigated the impact of an 
outsourcing deal’s importance to a supplier on relationship quality and outsourcing success (Blumenberg 
et al. 2009). Additionally, a few case studies provided insights into the dynamics of dependence (Lonsdale 
2001; Willcocks and Kern 1998; Willcocks and Currie 1997), indicating that the structure might often shift 
to an imbalance over time in favor of the supplier. Dependence and exercise of power are also highly 
relevant in the final phase of supplier switching and transition (see e.g., Chua et al. 2012; Whitten and 
Wakefield 2006). A client facing a high dependence on its supplier might be unable to terminate the 
contract due to high switching costs (Whitten and Wakefield 2006) or a lack of market alternatives 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Imbalanced relationships might also lead to opportunistic behavior by the 
outgoing supplier, posing a threat for the client’s business in this critical phase (Chua et al. 2012). 
Dependence has also been discussed in the context of multi-sourcing. Relying on multiple suppliers 
instead of contracting a single supplier, is widely seen as a means to reduce a client’s dependence on each 
individual IT supplier. However, often to the detriment of higher management and coordination costs 
(Huang et al. 2004; Levina and Su 2008; Sia et al. 2008; Willcocks and Lacity 1999). 
A study that addressed dependence between client and supplier in a survey-based approach is of Lee and 
Kim (1999, 2005). Herein, a positive relationship between joint dependence and quality of outsourcing 
relationships was posited. Inconsistent to findings in other disciplines (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et 
al. 1995), a negative relationship was found which was argued to arise due to particularities in the Korean 
market. While comparing their measures with those used in relationship marketing and so forth, the 
findings might have also been affected by 1) a strong focus on client dependence without referencing to 
supplier side and 2) no differentiation between balance and imbalance of dependencies. 
Based on our literature review, we argue that power and dependence contribute to the evolution, duration 
and success of IS outsourcing relationships, but are yet under-researched and need further clarification in 
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our field. The vast majority of IS outsourcing literature mentions ‘dependence’ in passing, without 
recognizing its more complex nature. This reasoning is underpinned by findings from an extensive 
literature review in ITO (Lacity et al. 2010) that identified only one article (Lee and Kim 1999) dealing 
with ‘mutual dependency’ as relationship characteristic. Especially, a dyadic perspective which includes a 
simultaneous incorporation of relative and joint dependence is needed. With a thorough 
conceptualization of client dependence within a dyadic outsourcing setting, we hope to lay a foundation 
for a more prospering use and analysis of these concepts in our discipline. Thereby, we will build on the 
profound dependence literature and traditional theories as being referred to in the following. 
Theories to Explain Dependence 
To explain dependence in relationships, several theories can be used, mainly, resource dependence theory 
(e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson 1981) and social exchange 
theory (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
Dependence is a key element in resource dependence theory (RDT). Herein, firms are described as open 
systems that must transact with their environment in order to obtain resources necessary for survival. 
Dependence arises from the circumstance that an organization cannot possess all resources needed itself. 
Furthermore, dependence on another organization is influenced by the importance of the obtained 
resource and the degree to which that resource is controlled by relatively few organizations (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) deals with the comparison of production and transaction costs to 
achieve economic efficiency (Coase 1937; Williamson, e.g., 1981). Transaction costs are defined as 
“comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance 
structures” (Williamson 1981). The theory describes the conditions of a transaction that lead to an optimal 
governance structure between market (external), hierarchy (internal) and hybrid. One major factor that 
influences the efficient governance form is the level of specific assets. Heide and John (1988) introduced 
transaction-specific investments as “those human and physical assets (tangible and intangible) required 
to support exchange and which are specialized to the exchange relationship”. Specific assets cannot be 
redeployed in other exchange relationships without losing value. In case of high specific investments, TCE 
suggests that internal production will enjoy greater advantages and will be more efficacious than markets 
(Williamson 1981). When still relying on the market option, however, asset specifity creates dependence 
for the investing party, opening up room for opportunistic behavior for the exchange partner and reducing 
its replaceability (Heide and John 1988). 
Social exchange theory (SET), originally developed to investigate interpersonal relations (Thibaut and 
Kelley 1959), has also been used to study dyadic relationships between organizations (Anderson and 
Narus 1984). A central construct in SET are outcomes obtained from a relationship, reflecting the 
difference between rewards received and costs incurred. To evaluate these outcomes, two further 
constructs have been posited, namely the comparison level () and the comparison level for alternatives 
(). Whereas  represents the expected outcomes from that kind of relationship based on experience, 
  reflects the average outcomes that are available from the best alternative relationship (Thibaut and 
Kelley 1959). If a firm obtains outcomes from an exchange relationship that exceed those available from 
alternatives, its dependence on the current partner increases (Anderson and Narus 1984; Thibaut and 
Kelley 1959). Even though, dependence arises here from more positive conditions (Scheer et al. 2010). 
Besides these three theories, another related perspective but rarely explicitly mentioned, is the switching 
costs perspective (see e.g., Bourantas 1989; Kumar et al. 1995). The term ‘switching costs’ (SC) is often 
used to describe the costs incurred by a substitution of a supplier (Bourantas 1989; Caniëls and 
Gelderman 2005; Heide and John 1988). Today’s literature defines and operationalizes “switching costs 
in terms of economic (i.e., monetary) expenditures and intangible (i.e., psychological or relational) costs 
associated with changing an exchange relationship” (Whitten and Wakefield 2006). Switching costs thus 
also address barriers to switching that create dependence on a current exchange partner. 
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Research Approach 
Research Design 
To thoroughly investigate a client’s dependence in dyadic IS outsourcing relationships, the case study 
approach was deemed particularly appropriate (Yin 2003, p. 13). Our research objectives are based on 
“what, why and how” questions which render the case study approach as an advantageous research 
method. More precisely, this study applies an inductive research approach with the aim to reach 
predominantly exploratory conclusions (Yin 2003). Recommendations and guidelines for case study 
research were considered to enhance the rigor of this study (Dubé and Paré 2003; Yin 2003). 
To get access to dyadic outsourcing relationships, an IT organization of a large-scale client enterprise 
(over 40,000 employees) operating in the passenger transportation sector was initially chosen. This IT 
organization was well suited for our study, because it has sufficient experience in IT outsourcing (over 70 
% of IT budget outsourced in 2010) and follows a multi-sourcing strategy which renders it representative 
(Yin 2003) for a number of other client companies (Kaiser and Buxmann 2012). 
Table 1. Overview of cases 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Short 
description 
“Sales Platform” 
“Self-Service 
Platform” 
“Core Service 
System” 
“CRM 
Platform” 
“GUI for 
Customer Service” 
Supplier 
description 
(app. values) 
global presence, 
400,000 
employees, 
revenue  
100 billion USD 
presence across 
Europe, 1,300 
employees, 
revenue 150 
million Euro 
global presence, 
10,000 
employees, 
revenue 2.5 
billion Euro 
international 
presence, 500 
employees, 
revenue 200 
million Euro 
in-house provider, 
global presence, 
3,000 employees, 
revenue 600 
million Euro 
Contract period 2009 - 2015 2009 - 2011 2005-2020 2008-2020 2011-2015 
Contract type 
and volume 
usage-related, 
20 million Euro 
framework 
contract, 2.9 
million Euro 
framework 
contract, 400 
million Euro 
fixed price  
volume, n. a. 
fixed price, > 10 
million Euro 
Current phase in  
IS lifecycle 
maintenance 
end of 
development 
development/ 
maintenance 
development 
maintenance, 
supplier transition 
 
Together with two contact persons directly reporting to the top-level management of the client’s IT 
organization, current outsourcing relationships were screened. The contractual relationships, i.e. cases, 
were chosen for enabling literal and theoretical replication logics (Yin 2003). As a prerequisite it has been 
requested that the respective supplier is commissioned for the development and/or maintenance of one of 
the client’s information systems. Furthermore, all contracts already had a minimum running time of at 
least one year at the time of investigation. In this way, we ensured that the basic settings of the contractual 
relationships were the same in each case (literal replication). For theoretical replication, we aimed to 
include different levels of dependence asymmetry/symmetry as well as high/low values to see how 
variations in the determinants influence the overall dependence. This initial evaluation was based on the 
gatekeepers’ perceived dependencies. This selection procedure resulted finally in five IS outsourcing 
relationships involving differing suppliers, which form respectively the unit of analysis. Since our study 
extends beyond the boundaries of a single company, it is best described as to follow a multiple-case design 
which ensures that findings are not fully idiosyncratic (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003). Table 1 
gives a descriptive overview of the selected outsourcing relationships. Beside descriptive characteristics, 
the table shows the current lifecycle phase of the IS, i.e., development or maintenance. Please notice, that 
case 5 is specific in that sense that a supplier transition is currently taking place. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The study was conducted in a time period of eight months, starting in September 2011. Since data 
triangulation is highly recommended in case study research, data collection was relied on multiple sources 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). Altogether, company documentation, in-depth interviews, and a 
questionnaire were used to raise confidence in our findings (Yin 2003). The study started with a screening 
of company documentation that provided background information of the five contractual relationships, 
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i.e., details about the IS, engaged people and suppliers. This initial data collection phase was followed by 
two major waves. The first wave was of qualitative nature and the second one involved the collection of 
quantitative data to strengthen our findings (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
In the first major wave, we conducted a total of 10 face-to-face interviews with 12 interviewees across five 
different sub-departments on client side. To complete the dyadic perspective, we then contacted the five 
suppliers. In total, six interviewees, encompassing project managers, team members and key account 
managers were involved here. All interviews were based on a pre-tested interview guideline encompassing 
semi-structured, open-ended questions. Different aspects were addressed herein: First, general 
information about the contractual relationship and the background of the interviewees. Next, an estimate 
of client and supplier dependence was questioned along with an explanation whether the dependencies 
were perceived to be balanced or not. This was followed by a discussion of influencing factors, their 
interplay as well as consequences. Whenever appropriate, we relied here on the laddering technique 
which follows a process of digging deeper by asking further questions (Reynolds and Olson 2001). This 
discussion was not limited to the chosen relationship, rather, interviewees drew on their experience 
already gathered in other contractual relationships (with other clients/suppliers) to enhance the 
generalizability of findings. 
Altogether, the interviews of the first round lasted about 20 hours and produced 382 pages of transcribed 
text. On average, one interview took 73 minutes. The text was encoded and structured using a qualitative 
data analysis (QDA) software. The coding procedure was undertaken as follows (Corbin and Strauss 1998; 
Miles and Huberman 1994): A coding list was initially developed by two researchers. During the coding 
process still omitted codes were added to the list after agreement. The interview data revealed a large set 
of factors influencing client dependence which were iteratively regrouped, aggregated and redefined. 
Different streams of literature and theories (cf. Section 2) were used to facilitate the causal mapping and 
to raise the conceptual level of our work (Eisenhardt 1989). Within this analysis step, the main tasks were 
the separation into direct and indirect influencing factors, as well as to avoid an overlapping (mutual 
exclusiveness), while, at the same time, striving to reach a high degree of completeness (exhaustiveness). 
Case analysis meetings with a research assistant, previously involved in data collection, and the co-author, 
not involved in data collection, were frequently held, discussing the interpretations to create a common 
understanding of the respective cases and emerging categories (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
Table 2. Overview of interviewees across cases 
Client side Supplier side 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Division manager - - - 1/* - Project manager - 1/* - 1/* 1/* 
Team member 1 1 1/* - 1 Team member - - - - - 
Team / project manager 2/* 1/* - 1 1 Account manager 1/* 1 1 - 1 
Contract manager - - 1 - 1/*  
Subtotal 3 2 2 2 3 Subtotal 1 2 1 1 2 
Total: 19 interviewees in 16 interviews in first round and 10 questionnaires collected for second round (*participant) 
A second wave of data collection involved a questionnaire survey which queried client and supplier 
dependence as well as the derived determinants with different items on a 7-point Likert scale. A pre-test 
of the questionnaire with two respondents was initially conducted, discussing reactions to questions form, 
wording, and order. In this final round, one representative of the five relationships on each side, client 
and supplier, was respectively asked to fill in the questionnaire (see Table 2). This procedure was 
accompanied by an interviewer who recorded the feedback and the reasons for a specific ranking. 
Framework of Client Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
To facilitate the presentation of our empirical results, we first pre-structure the concept of client 
dependence by proposing a generic framework of dependence determinants.  
Reviewing literature in the field of dependence reveals that slightly differing perspectives on an 
organization’s dependence evolved over time. Jacobs (1974), recalling Emerson’s two-fold view, suggests 
differentiating between ‘essentiality’ of a resource and its ‘availability’ to assess dependence. For the 
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latter, he proposes to take the number of available alternatives for supplying a product or service into 
account. However, the mere number of existing supply alternatives seems to fall short under some specific 
circumstances. Namely, when there are further barriers that bind an organization to its partner. It is 
stated that dependence is further influenced by the “difficulty involved in replacing the incumbent 
exchange partner” (Heide and John 1988). Scholars in dependence research have therefore incorporated 
factors to reflect barriers of a source’s substitutability. For example, when the organization has made 
significant transaction-specific investments (Heide and John 1988) or when the outcomes associated with 
alternatives are lower than those in the current relationship (Anderson and Narus 1984), dependence is 
increased as a consequence of the difficulties to replace the exchange partner with an existing alternative. 
To estimate the dependence of an organization A on an organization B, with regard to a resource R, it is 
argued, that there is a multiplicative relationship between importance (or essentiality) of the resource R 
and its substitutability with a source other than B (Bourantas 1989, following Pfeffer and Salancik 1978): 
DependenceA	on	B 	 Importance, ∗ 1  Substitutability&, 
Conceptually, both constructs, importance and substitutability, can be based on a scale from 0 to 1. 
Hence, the product, i.e., dependence, ranges also from 0 to 1, whereas a value of 0 signifies that there is 
no dependence and 1 reflects the maximum possible dependence (Bourantas 1989). If the resource R has 
no importance or the incumbent exchange partner is fully substitutable, the dependence will be close to or 
equal to zero, showing that it is very low or inexistent (Bourantas 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Basically, the two determinants proved to be also central facets of client dependence in our discipline. To 
capture, however, the peculiarities of IS outsourcing, we propose the following models. At the left of 
Figure 1, a single sourcing model is considered, in which the supplier delivers the whole functionality for 
the IS. This particular IS is further assumed to support one or more of the client’s business processes. The 
covered functionality by the IS has a certain degree of importance (ImpIS,Client) for the company. It is low, 
if, for example, a relatively unimportant back-office process is concerned, or very high, if the IS covers the 
company’s sales process. To incorporate the second facet, the substitutability of the incumbent supplier 
(Subst), i.e., efforts to replace it with an alternative supplier to provide the IS functionality, is considered. 
In this regard, different options are possible, e.g., a supplier that takes over the current IS or even a 
supplier which brings in an alternate IS (different product, technology etc.) but with comparable 
functionalities. While not focused on in our study, apart from an in-house alternative (subsidiary 
company), backsourcing could also represent a valid supply alternative. For instance, when the IS turns 
out to be highly specific in the sense of TCE, managing the IS internally can be the most efficient solution. 
A decision maker will weigh up the viable options against each other, all of which, are determining the 
substitutability of the incumbent supplier.  
 
Figure 1. Framework of client dependence determinants 
 
Since multiple suppliers are often involved in developing an IS, we extend the model to reflect a multi 
sourcing setting. Substitutability, Subst, is assumed to be higher in a multi sourcing arrangement, since 
supplier A accounts for a smaller part of the IS compared to single sourcing. With regard to importance, 
we adjust the previous model slightly. The previous Imp expressed the importance of the covered 
functionality by the (whole) IS for the client company. To be more precise, we rename this variable to 
ImpIS,Client. Components delivered by the supplier are called IS’. To express the importance of IS’ for IS, we 
introduce a new variable ImpIS’,IS. Please note that the use of these two variables is not compulsory. 
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Equally, the overall importance of supplied components to the client company can be measured directly. 
This separation is, however, helpful when a detailed breakdown across hierarchy levels is needed. 
In this study, we focused on perceived dependence, e.g., client’s self-perceived dependence, rather than on 
actual dependence. The latter is hard to gather since necessary data to establish a fully objective measure 
is seldom available. Despite a potential discrepancy, we don’t see a big drawback in this point. Perceived 
dependence is assumed to govern a decision maker’s behavior and is therefore of primary concern here. 
While, theoretically, a multiplicative relationship between the two determinants is plausible, we relax this 
condition for perceived dependence and use a still to be determined function f in our domain: 
Perceived	dependence	Client	on	Supplier*+,  f ./Imp01,234567 ∗ Imp01,,018, /1  Subst19::345;,*+,8<	
	=>/Imp01,234567 ∗ Imp01,,018 ? 0	and	=>/1  Subst19::345;,*+,8 ? 0	andmin =  =0,0  0 and	max=  =1,1  1 
Empirical Findings from IS Development/Maintenance Outsourcing  
With our goal to determine and explain a client’s position within a dyadic dependence structure, the 
empirical findings are structured into four parts, making extensive use of data collected from both 
perspectives, client and supplier. The first part uses relative and joint dependence with dyadic data to 
illustrate a client’s positioning in comparison to its supplier’s. The following sections then focus on 
explaining a specific client dependence position. In the second section, collected data is used to assess and 
verify the relationship between the two central determinants, IS importance and supplier’s 
substitutability, as proposed by the previously provided framework of client dependence. In an 
exploratory manner, the third section presents identified factors to influence client dependence in our 
domain and refines our conceptualization. Finally, these factors are quantified and used to explain in 
more detail the respective client dependencies across the cases. 
Perception of Dyadic Dependence Structure 
To obtain a dyadic perspective, we firstly incorporate a client’s dependence on its respective suppliers and 
vice versa. Basically, to collect dyadic data, two ways have evolved in literature. First, data can be collected 
on only one side, i.e., client or supplier, but using estimated dependence values for the other side. The 
second approach, which has become known as ‘full dyadic’, involves collection of dependence data on 
both sides of a dyad. We followed the latter which particularly allows for a comparison of perceptions 
between client and supplier. 
Figure 2 shows two dependence or power maps (Caniëls and Gelderman 2005; Cox et al. 2003) of the five 
outsourcing relationships investigated. The left one illustrates the client perspective (CP) on the dyadic 
dependencies, the right one the respective suppliers’ perspective (SP). In both figures, the abscissa depicts 
the perceived client dependence, ranging from low ([0-0.33[), over medium ([0.33-0.66[) to high ([0.66-
1]). Accordingly, perceived supplier dependence is shown along the ordinate. In this step, dependence was 
respectively measured by three reflective items (see Table 3). 1 
From the client perspective, own dependence currently ranges from medium, as in case 1 (0.44) to high, 
as in case 4 (1.00). Perceived supplier dependence is respectively lower or equal to the self-perceived 
dependence, whereas the highest gap is given in case 5 with 0.33. Thus, the relative dependence is quite 
small across the cases. There are even two cases (case 1 and 4) where a dependence symmetry is perceived 
on client side, i.e., the relative dependence is equal to zero. According to Emerson (1962), neither party 
should be able to obtain a power advantage in these two cases. In the remaining cases, the client perceives 
a structure in favor for the supplier with a relative dependence of 0.22 (in case 2) and 0.17 (in case 3). 
Consequently, there is no case in which the client sees himself in a more powerful position. Table 3 also 
shows values for joint dependence. The lowest joint dependence is given in case 1 with 0.89. In contrast, 
case 4 shows the highest possible joint dependence with 2.00. It is striking, that in three cases (2,3 and 4) 
joint dependence is relatively high, reflecting that client and supplier face high exit barriers. Additionally, 
                                                             
1 Supplier and client dependence are measured by taking the average score on three reflective measured items respectively. These 
were based on Frazier’s and Emerson’s conceptualization of dependence. A party’s dependence is the “need to maintain the 
relationship in order to achieve desired goals” (Frazier 1983). Relative dependence is measured on a scale from - 1 (maximum 
supplier's dependence) to + 1 (maximum client's dependence). Joint dependence is measured on a scale from + 0 (minimum 
dependence) to + 2 (maximum dependence). 
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no case is positioned in the cell of low joint dependence (reflecting both, low client and supplier 
dependence), demonstrating that no relationship is loosely coupled and characterized by a mutual 
flexibility in switching to alternatives. 
 
Figure 2. Dependence maps from client and supplier perspective 
 
Comparing the client’s perception of the outsourcing relationship with the suppliers’ perceptions (Figure 
2, on the right), provides further insight. Whereas the interviewees on client side perceive balanced 
dependencies in cases 1 and 4, the respective suppliers observe an imbalance in favor for the client in case 
4 and a supplier dominance in case 1. This means, for instance, that the supplier’s dependence is 
perceived higher by the client (0.44) than in the self-perception of the supplier (0.22). In case 5, the 
supplier perceives its own and the client’s dependence higher. The opposite applies to case 2, in which 
both sides received a lower rating. The case evidence reveals a significant incongruence in the perception 
of dependencies between client and supplier. In case 3, a high joint but balanced dependence structure is 
perceived on supplier side. 
Since we investigated only five cases, any conclusions from their distribution in the map should be 
carefully drawn. However, it is striking that on both sides, client and supplier, medium to high 
dependencies were predominantly found. Low dependencies were rare, only the self-perceived supplier 
dependence in case 1 is located in the lower quadrant. Moreover, also from both perspectives, suppliers 
are mostly seen to be in a more powerful position. Our case study shows that the dyadic perspective being 
common in dependence research is transferrable to our domain and extends the prevailing unilateral 
view. To know whether a client has a low or high dependence is essential, but the integration of supplier 
dependence is more accurate and completes the dependence structure. It further reveals power potentials 
and the degree of joint dependence, which cannot be elucidated when addressing only one half of the 
dyad. 
Table 3. Values of perceived client and supplier dependence, relative and joint dependence 
 
Client perspective (CP) Supplier perspective (SP) 
(Self-
perceived) 
depend.(1) 
Perceived 
supplier 
depend.(2) 
Relative 
depend. 
(1)-(2) 
Joint 
depend. 
(1)+(2) 
Perceived 
client 
depend. (1) 
(Self-
perceived)  
depend. (2) 
Relative 
depend. 
(1)-(2) 
Joint 
depend. 
(1)+(2) 
Case 1 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.89 0.67 0.22 0.44 0.89 
Case 2 0.89 0.67 0.22 1.56 0.61 0.39 0.22 1.00 
Case 3 0.89 0.72 0.17 1.61 0.83 0.83 0.00 1.66 
Case 4 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.50 0.83 -0.33 1.33 
Case 5 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.83 0.61 0.22 1.44 
Assessment and Impact of Client Dependence Determinants 
With our second goal to conceptualize client dependence, the next sections are dealing with a better 
understanding of the different client positions in the dependence structures. Based on our derived 
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framework in the previous section, Table 4 shows the values of the dependence determinants that were 
respectively assessed by representatives of the contractual relationships. Again, we tried to include both 
assessments, from client (CP) and supplier perspective (SP). The first row shows perceived overall 
importance, reflecting the importance of delivered IS components. While we will present the 
disaggregated values later on, the results here show that the overall perceived importance in all cases is 
very high except for case 1, ranging from 0.83 to 1.00. With regard to substitutability efforts necessary to 
switch to an alternative supplier, case 1 also has a special position in our case selection. Whereas the effort 
was assessed as moderate (0.33) from the client perspective, it was substantial in the remaining four 
cases. From the data in Table 4, it is apparent that perceptual differences between client and supplier also 
occur on the level of determinants. 
Table 4. Assessment of client dependence determinants from client and supplier perspective 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
  CP SP CP SP CP SP CP SP CP SP 
Overall importance (ImpIS,Client, ImpIS’,IS) 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 1.00 
(1-substitutability) 0.33 0.67 0.83 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 
Client dependence 0.44 0.67 0.89 0.61 0.89 0.83 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.83 
To analyze the relations between importance, substitutability and client dependence in our cases, we use 
the scatterplot logic (Miles and Huberman 1994). Figure 3 includes our two determinants, 1-
substitutability and importance, on the axis and perceived client dependence is denoted by size and color 
of the circle. Figure 3 shows that the expected logic, namely the multiplicative relationship between the 
dependence determinants (cf. section 4, framework), largely applies to our investigated cases: The 
majority of cases shows a higher perceived dependence, when importance and 1-substitutability increase. 
Deviations to this reasoning, can be found in case 4 (SP) and in case 5 (CP). In the latter, the client 
observes a high importance (0.83) and very limited substitutability (1.00). Surprisingly, self-perceived 
dependence is, however, lower rated (0.67). However, this rating can be explained by exceptional 
conditions, since the client is currently switching to an alternative supplier. Our recordings revealed that 
dependence was assessed as medium, reflecting the remaining dependence on this supplier. 
Inconsequently, the substitutability efforts were assessed as very high (1.00), while not equally reflecting 
here that a significant amount has already been incurred. Here, we would have expected a smaller 
remaining value as well. Particular attention should be paid to this point in future studies, especially with 
regard to measurement items. An outlier is given with case 4 (SP) where the divergence could not be 
explained with interview data. A higher value of client dependence would have led to a better fit. 
 
Figure 3. Scatter plot of client dependence and its determinants 
Decomposing Client Dependence 
So far, we considered dependence as a composite construct of two determinants, importance and 
substitutability. However, the framework fails short when a more detailed analysis is needed. In 
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particular, what are the salient underlying facets of the two determinants? This section will draw on our 
case study interviews as well as on the different general theories described in the beginning. 
Importance 
As mentioned before, scholars in dependence research argue that the ‘importance’ of a resource is a 
relevant determinant of dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The predominant dimensions discussed 
in literature are the magnitude of exchange and its cruciality. Our findings confirm their relevancy in IS 
outsourcing relationships and suggest their occurrences on both levels, IS (ImpIS’,IS) and company 
(ImpIS,Client). 
Relative magnitude 
Grounded in RDT, relative magnitude corresponds to how large the share of this resource is of an 
organization’s total inputs or of a category of the total (Bourantas 1989). The proportion of total 
purchasing volume is one way to express the relative magnitude accounted for by a supplier (Gulati and 
Sytch 2007). For example, on IS level, it is conceivable that the relative magnitude could be well assessed 
by comparing single vs. multi-sourcing options (e.g., Levina and Su 2008). Basically, if there is more than 
one supplier involved in the, e.g., IS development, and the purchasing volume is equally shared, the 
client’s dependence on one of the multiple suppliers decreases compared to the single-sourcing model. In 
our cases there was mostly either only one supplier involved or the supplier acted as a prime contractor. 
Case 1, however, depicts an example where the importance of the supplier’s contribution was diminished 
with the cancellation of a general contractor agreement. The supplier’s relative magnitude was reduced in 
this way. 
“Our dependence on that supplier declined, when we cancelled the general contractor agreement and 
commissioned directly a former subcontractor of an important system component.” Case 1 (CP) 
Relative value contribution 
Whilst relative magnitude is in most cases relatively easy to assess, it is not sufficient, at least 
conceptually, to determine the whole importance of an obtained resource. Recalling Emerson (1962), the 
relationship’s contribution to the focal company’s desired goals needs to be considered. Next to relative 
magnitude, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) therefore introduced ‘criticality’ which reflects “the ability of the 
organization to continue functioning in the absence of the resource”. Bourantas (1989) broadened this 
idea, distinguishing a strategic criticality next to the more (functional) criticality, reflecting a resource’s 
contribution to achieve a competitive advantage. In marketing channel literature, the resource’s 
contribution to sales and profit are often used as a measure (Geyskens et al. 1996; Heide and John 1988; 
Kumar et al. 1995). In IS research, IS importance is more difficult to assess and different value categories 
have been discussed (Melville et al. 2004; Shang and Seddon 2002; Tallon et al. 2000). These include cost 
reduction, improving quality and speed, enhancing overall firm effectiveness as well as reaching new 
markets with the use of IS. Equally relevant is finance and regulatory compliance, which can lead to cost 
avoidance. 
Besides magnitude of the IS, we need to incorporate the relative value contribution. This is based on the 
assumption that the importance (or overall value contribution) of an IS can be high, while accounting only 
for a relatively small purchasing magnitude or vice versa. That is, an IS relative value contribution can 
differ from its relative magnitude. For example, maintenance services of a sales system might be more 
crucial to the company’s success than similar services to a back-office system, even if the financial 
magnitude of exchange is equal (ImpIS,Client). Similarly, two suppliers can account for a comparable 
relative purchasing volume, but the components of one supplier can contribute above-average to the 
client, leading to a higher benefit-cost ratio (ImpIS’,IS). The importance of an IS or a component of the IS is 
thus a function of the relative magnitude and the relative value contribution (see e.g., El-Ansary and Stern 
1972). 
“The more critical our system, the higher is our dependence on the supplier.[…] If a system is less critical, our 
dependence is low.” Case 3 (CP) 
“If we stopped working, there would be a high risk that a central application would crash, [leading to high 
financial damage]. In this regard, client’s dependence is high.” Case 5 (SP) 
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Substitutability 
In IS outsourcing, a supplier’s substitutability is synonymous with a multitude of factors. Analysis of the 
case study interviews and an on-going comparison with prior contributions in the switching cost (Jones et 
al. 2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006) and dependence field led to the following factors. 
Supplier alternatives 
As RDT proposes, a client’s dependence on a supplier is interrelated to the number of supplier 
alternatives (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). A limited number of alternatives lowers the substitutability of the 
incumbent supplier and therefore increases the perceived dependence. The number of alternative sources 
has been identified as a crucial dimension of client dependence and has been used in several contributions 
(e.g., Ganesan 1994; Gulati and Sytch 2007). In IS outsourcing relationships, the existence of alternatives 
seems to influence the client’s dependence as well:  
“The reason for our low dependence… I think, there are enough suppliers on the market, who could deliver the 
same as our current supplier.” Case 1 (CP) 
“I think, at the moment we are fully dependent on our supplier. […] Second, there are not many companies on the 
market, who offer such a CRM application.” Case 4 (CP) 
Evaluation and selection efforts 
Even if there are known market alternatives, there are still further reasons that hamper a substitution of 
the exchange partner in IS outsourcing. In case of a large information system, for example, supplier 
switching usually requires a substantial amount of resources, know-how and time to conduct the phases 
from preselecting and evaluating alternatives to finally selecting an appropriate new supplier. To do so, 
the client needs, among other things, to be aware of the requirements of the incumbent IS and to compare 
it with existing supply alternatives. When the client has lost this critical know-how over time, selecting an 
alternative becomes a challenging task. Furthermore, the acquisition of lacking resources and expertise 
represent costs or at least opportunity costs, since the value of an alternate use of the resources is 
foregone. This facet also includes efforts to set up and review a new contract. Put together, evaluation and 
selection efforts represent transaction costs and are supposed to be an important facet. 
“The effort to evaluate the market alternatives was immense. People would not want to go through this again in 
the next years.” Case 3 (CP) 
“Efforts to understand and specify the today’s system functionality should not be underestimated in case of a new 
bidding.” Case 1 (SP) 
Performance uncertainty of alternative suppliers 
A further barrier arises from the uncertainty associated with the performance level of alternative suppliers 
(Whitten and Wakefield 2006). In IS outsourcing, the supplier’s capability and performance level is an 
important success factor (Grover et al. 1996). However, clients might face the challenge that the 
performance and capability levels of an alternative supplier are unknown and hard to predict in advance. 
Even if a high degree of evaluation efforts can lower the gap between expectation and knowledge, we 
argue that the remaining uncertainty is a switching barrier. The following quotes emphasize its relevance: 
“There are others who could manage our system, but if they could do this in the same quality, I dare to question.” 
Case 1 (CP) 
“Basically we could transfer this service to supplier X. But would this really provide an advantage? It is not per 
definition proven , that the service of supplier X is really better than what we have today.” Case 2 (CP) 
Sunk costs 
Sunk costs encompass the client’s perception of non-recoverable time, money and effort invested in the 
outsourcing relationship (Jones et al. 2002; Whitten & Wakefield 2006). Sunk costs are seen as irrelevant 
according to classical economic and normative principles of economy (Whyte 1994). The reason is that 
historical sunk costs cannot be changed by future action and only future costs and benefits should be 
taken into account in the sense of a rational decision making model (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Whyte 
1994). However, sunk costs can lead to a bias in decision-making and explain why a decision-maker 
perseveres with e.g., an unproductive IS development project (Keil et al. 1995). In an environment of high 
asset specifity, a significant amount of transaction-specific sunk costs of a non-redeployable variety is 
present (Whyte 1994). Typical sunk costs in IS outsourcing relationships might be past costs for training 
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employees for a specific IS (Vetter et al. 2010) or development costs, when the client is not granted the 
right to transfer the current IS to an alternative supplier for the maintenance phase. Our findings suggest 
that the amount of sunk costs negatively influences the substitutability of an incumbent supplier, adding 
to perceived dependence.  
“So, then we have invested more money, more resources, and more know-how. You don’t change the supplier so 
easily, you know?” Case 4  (CP) 
“Of course, if we had possessed the software ownership, we could have talked about a scenario such as: We look 
for another supplier, which continues with the development. But in this case, the prior developments would have 
been in vain.” Case 5 (CP) 
Lost benefits 
The need to maintain a relationship can also arise from more positive motivations, resulting from the 
benefits received from the incumbent relationship. Especially if the replaceability of these benefits are 
limited, a so called benefit-based dependence arises (Scheer et al. 2010). These considerations trace back 
to SET (Thibaut and Kelley 1959), which compares the outcomes of a current relationship to those 
available from alternatives. Outcomes or benefits include e.g., high service quality, discounts, or special 
support services, such as technical assistance and consulting (Anderson and Narus 1984). Benefits lost 
upon contract dissolution are seen as crucial components of the substitutability construct (Jones et al. 
2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006) and are hypothesized to positively influence perceived dependence. 
However, if the currently obtained outcomes are lower than those expected from alternate exchange 
partners, lost benefits are not present and do not bind the client to its current supplier. 
“With regard to the contract extension, the cooperation with our supplier is exemplary. They keep deadlines and 
their side of a bargain. We do not experience that with our other partners.” Case 1 (CP) 
“This supplier offers us many more functionalities. We can also exploit synergy effects that another supplier 
could not provide us.” Case 3 (CP) 
Post-selection client side costs 
With the decision to switch to an alternate supplier, the client encounters further costs to stem the 
switching process. For example, the client usually needs to make personnel available to transfer 
requirements and to upscale the new supplier. Direct expenses and investments in human resources, such 
as training of employees, or even the hiring of additional IS expertise will increase this facet. Also worth 
mentioning are overhead costs on client side, which are needed to coordinate the whole switching process. 
Switching to a new supplier, might incur additional time and effort to learn and adapt to new policies, 
procedures and routines deployed by the new supplier (Jones et al. 2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006). 
If the new supplier has a strong power position, these costs may be particularly significant for the client, 
since the supplier will try to dictate the procedures and routines prospectively used in the relationship. 
“The time needed to switch to another supplier increases the dependence. This switching duration means we have 
to set up a project and efforts are needed to migrate from A to B. If there is much to migrate, inhibition 
thresholds are high.” Case 1(CP) 
“One should not underestimate the time needed for the bidding process and the final replacement. These efforts 
would create a decline in innovation, since - under constant resources - the maintenance of the current system 
would suffer.” Case 1 (CP) 
Set-up costs of alternate supplier 
Set-up costs include economic and relational investments in a new supplier to enable a fulfillment of its 
contract, namely to (further) develop and possibly operate the IS. In particular, as a prerequisite, 
requirements and business knowledge needs to be transferred to the supplier. To reach the latest work 
state, new set-up costs will arise on supplier side, depending on the degree of reusability, which the client 
usually has to bear. These costs also include learning costs, such as understanding interfaces to 
surrounding systems in the client’s system architecture. An indication of a long switching duration often 
expresses the magnitude of the supplier related set-up cost. In IS outsourcing, the time needed for 
supplier learning should not be underestimated. In case of maintenance of an existing system, the time 
needed to understand the functional and technical conditions might be immense.  
“This system requires a lot of specific functional know-how. It would be very difficult to put another supplier in the 
position to further develop our system.” Case 5 (CP) 
“As a client, when I would like to switch my supplier, the new one needs a training period, he is not so efficient in 
the first years.” Case 4 (SP) 
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Table 5. Underlying facets of the client dependence construct 
Higher-level 
factor 
Influencing factor Description 
ImpIS,Client, 
ImpIS’,IS 
1 Relative magnitude (+) 
Share of magnitude, e.g., purchasing volume, related to the 
IS/IS’. 
2 Relative value contribution (+) 
Degree of value contribution of the covered functionality (by the 
IS/IS’) in relation to relative magnitude. 
Subst. 
3 Supplier alternatives (+) Number of supplier alternatives for the IS/IS’ or a similar IS/IS’. 
4 Evaluation and selection 
efforts (-) 
Perception of time and effort needed for evaluating and selecting 
a new supplier. 
5 Performance uncertainty of 
alternative suppliers (-) 
Uncertainty or perception of risk surrounding the performance 
of alternative suppliers. 
6 Sunk costs (-) 
Perception of non-recoverable time, money and effort invested in 
the outsourcing relationship. 
7 Lost benefits (-) 
Perception of benefits resulting from the current relationship 
and which are lost upon contract termination. 
8 Post-selection client side costs 
(-) 
Perception of time, effort and financial outlays needed to 
conduct the switching process on client side. 
9 Set-up costs of alternate 
supplier (-) 
Perception of upcoming investments in the alternate supplier 
necessary to reach the previous work state (related to the IS/IS’). 
Dep. 10 Spillover effects (+) 
Perception of magnitude of negative reactions by the supplier in 
other exchange relationships caused by a (planned) termination 
of the focal relationship. 
Spillover Effects 
So far, we have encountered nine different underlying facets of importance and substitutability which are 
summarized in Table 5. However, during data analysis another factor emerged – here referred to as 
spillover effects – which is assumed to influence perceived client dependence. Spillover effects are specific 
in the sense that they result from other exchange relationships present between the client and its supplier. 
They represent potential, undesirable consequences which a supplier might cause as a reaction to a 
terminated relationship by the client or to its plan to do so. Taking revenge or a backlash due to contract 
termination were also posited in marketing channel relationships by Weiss and Anderson (1992). Even 
though, the supplier might react negatively within the current relationship, for example, by delaying the 
switching process to the competing supplier, the scope for negative reactions increases with further 
exchange relationships; especially, if the supplier possesses therein an untapped power potential. In that 
sense, dissatisfaction with the client’s contract termination can spill over to other exchange relationships. 
Spillover effects have often been mentioned in the case study interviews. Examples include price increases 
in interconnected systems provided by the same supplier. They can also arise in non-IT related exchange 
relationships, e.g., when the supplier has gained a significant purchasing power of the client’s products. 
Revenues which are then in danger to be diminished might also hamper a termination of the focal 
exchange relationship. This factor might add to an explanation why clients, although able to substitute a 
current supplier, and unsatisfied, have to further maintain the exchange relationship. Therefore, we argue 
that the client’s perceived dependence is increased by the perception of negative spillover effects. 
“The problem is, we have not only selected a core provider, we are also dependent on the interfaces… the supplier 
has the opportunity to do a prohibitive pricing, or to create barriers, that we have to say, [a replacement] does not 
make sense.” Case 3 (CP) 
“Supplier A is not just a supplier, he is also our customer. Supplier A has also a significant purchasing volume and 
in this particular year, they withdrew volume on purpose and gave it to our competitor.” Case 1 (CP) 
Assessment of Dependence Facets 
In the final wave on client side, we used the derived influencing facets to analyze client dependence in 
detail across the cases (see Figure 4). In accordance to our framework, overall importance (see Table 4) 
was disaggregated into the importance of the covered functionality by the IS for the company (ImpIS,Client) 
and the relative importance of the supplier’s delivered functionality for the whole IS (ImpIS’,IS). As Figure 4 
shows, IS importance (ImpIS,Client) is very high across all cases. The investigated systems are core or front-
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end systems to the customer. As indicated earlier, the respective suppliers mostly account for the major 
part of the entire development of the system, which is reflected in high values of ImpIS’,IS. The subfacets, 
relative magnitude and value contribution, facilitate a detailed analysis here. In case 1, the supplier 
accounts for 30 percent of the total purchasing volume for the IS, a second supplier for 70 percent. 
However, the relative value contribution is favoring the second supplier, since disproportionate valuable 
components are delivered here. Thus, the relative value contribution of the considered supplier was rated 
below-average (<1). Consequently, the supplier’s importance for the system was rated 0.17 and thus below 
the 30 percent share of financial magnitude. Case 4 represents an example where the reverse appeared 
(0.7;>1). Note that we were only able to derive these values for the ImpIS’,IS hierarchy. While it is 
theoretically appealing that the two facets are equally relevant on the higher level, empirical values could 
not be collected due to two restrictions: 1) relative financial magnitude could not be determined reliably, 
2) the information basis for a more fine-grained assessment of the value contribution in comparison to 
other systems was missing. 
 
Figure 4. Subfacets of client dependence determinants (client perspective) 
Turning to the substitutability facets, the ratings suggest that a lack of supplier alternatives is in three 
cases (cases 3, 4 and 5) a substantial barrier to switching. In the remaining cases, the procurement market 
is characterized by a sufficient number of alternatives. However, it has to be noted, that both, availability 
of alternatives and the associated performance uncertainty varies significantly across the cases. Sunk costs 
are perceived as high in almost all cases. Moreover, in some cases the client obtains benefits that could 
not be realized in alternative relationships, which increases the positive side of dependence. In all cases, 
the remaining three factors, evaluation and selection efforts, post-selection client side and supplier set-up 
costs were rated very high (on average 0.73, 0.87 and 0.80). A moderate rating was given on average for 
expected spillover effects, ranging from 0.00 in case 4 to 0.83 in case 2. However, in case 4 spillover 
effects were simply not relevant, because there was just one exchange relationship to this supplier. If this 
extreme case is ignored, the mean average increases to 0.58. 
At the end of the second data collection phase, interview partners on client side were asked if they 
considered the list of factors as relevant and complete to assess client dependence. The relevance was 
confirmed for each factor (>4 on a scale from 1 to 7). On average, the factors received a rating of 5.27. 
Moreover, our interview partners had the impression that the list was complete and able to reflect client 
dependence in IS outsourcing. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary of Key Findings 
Over the last years, the management of client-supplier relationships in an IS outsourcing setting has 
received increasing attention in research as well as in practice (Hirschheim et al. 2008; Kaiser and 
Buxmann 2012; Oshri et al. 2011; Rottman 2008). As a crucial relationship aspect, the focus was here set 
on a detailed analysis of dependencies between clients and suppliers in IS outsourcing dyads.  
To contribute theoretically, we drew on dependence research and extended the still prevailing simplistic 
view on this concept in IS outsourcing research. Conceptually and empirically, we did not only assess the 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Average
ImpIS, Client 0.83 1 .00 1 .00 0.83 1 .00 0.93
ImpIS',IS (Rel. Magn., Rel. Value Contr.) 0.1 7 0.83 0.83 0.83 1 .00 0.7 3
Lack of supplier  alternativ es (rev erse) 0.00 0.1 7 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.40
Ev aluation and selection efforts 0.33 0.67 0.83 0.83 1 .00 0.7 3
Performance uncertainty  of alternativ es 0.33 0.1 7 0.33 0.83 0.67 0.47
Sunk Cost 0.83 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.63
Lost benefits 0.67 0.50 0.83 0.1 7 0.83 0.60
Post-selection client side costs 0.67 0.83 0.83 1 .00 1 .00 0.87
Set-up costs of alternate supplier 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.67 1 .00 0.80
Dependence Spillov er Effects 0.50 0.83 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.47
Substitut-
ability
Importance
(0.3;<1) (0.95;1) (1 ;1)(1 ;1) (0.7;>1)
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magnitude of client dependence, but incorporated the supplier side and its dependence as well. We used 
two central constructs, relative and joint dependence, to adequately describe a dependence structure in a 
dyad. While collecting assessments from both sides, a significant perceptual incongruence was observed.  
To provide reasons for different client positions in the dependence map, a framework from prior research 
in reference disciplines was initially derived. Dependence was presented as a composite construct of the 
outsourced IS components’ importance and the substitutability of the supplier, currently developing or 
maintaining them. Moreover, several theories were integrated to describe the constituting elements. The 
transfer of these general theories and linking them with specialties of our domain were facilitated by our 
dyadic case study approach. As a result, 10 underlying facets were retrieved that our interviewees 
considered as adequate to assess client dependence in our study context. As an unanticipated aspect 
“spillover effects” emerged which extended the previous two categories. Dissatisfaction with a client’s 
decision to terminate a relationship can spill over to other relationships between the partners and lead to 
an exploitation of an untapped power potential. Since the dependence facets were identified in an 
exploratory manner, involving several expert interviews and supported by literature, a high degree of 
generalizability is expected. A first ‘proof-of-concept’ was presented with their quantification in our cases 
which further underlined their usefulness and explanatory power. 
Our research also provides managerial implications: The conceptualization of client dependence offers 
companies involved in IS outsourcing insights into how to influence their dependence position in current 
and future exchange relationships. Furthermore, the dyadic perspective presented has various 
implications for both sides. To keep an eye on partner’s dependence and on the own dependence can 
prove valuable in the long-run. Perceptual incongruences can trigger a critical investigation of the self-
perception and can help to reveal untapped potentials to increase outsourcing success. The dependence 
map used herein was assessed as a powerful visualization tool by the practitioners involved in our study. 
Discussion, Limitations and Future Research 
We hope that the proposed conceptualizations bring us closer to rigorous, empirical analysis of 
dependence and power in IS outsourcing relationships. Nevertheless, the findings are subject to 
limitations. Although we tried to get access to different cases, also including those with low dependence, 
our cases showed mostly medium-to-high levels. Further studies are therefore needed to investigate the 
full range of possible dependence combinations. The exact composition, i.e., the weighting coefficients for 
the presented determinants and their facets, is still to be determined for the wide range of IS outsourcing 
relationships.  
Although full dyadic data is much harder to access, it is exceptionally valuable in the context of 
dependence. Since matched pair surveys are also rare in other research disciplines (Gulati and Sytch 
2007; Kumar et al. 1995), especially when it comes to investigations of perceptual differences, such 
studies have the potential to contribute back to dependence research in reference disciplines. Some 
interesting questions are e.g.: Are there systematic patterns of over-/underestimation? And also, what are 
consequences of a great mismatch of perceived dependencies on the use of power and relationship 
quality? With our introduction of the two constructs, relative and joint dependence, we hope to have 
inspired future studies to incorporate them in other research models in our domain, e.g., to study their 
impacts on relationship quality and business performance. Although this study focused on the 
conceptualization of client dependence within dyadic outsourcing relationships, a few hints can be given 
for future research at this point. Among the most mentioned ‘negative’ consequences resulting from 
powerful IT suppliers were price increases, decrease of service quality (especially responsiveness of 
supplier’s personnel) and loss of innovative potential for clients. A few interviewees confirmed that 
symmetric dependence relationships are more beneficial for both parties. However, interviewees 
perceived differences in the degree to which IT suppliers exploited power potentials. Further research 
could, for instance, investigate whether a power potential directly translates into the use of power and 
what possibly hinders IT suppliers from making extensive use of power.  
Besides profiting from a higher explanatory power for theoretical models in the IS domain, dependence 
research in IS could potentially inform reference disciplines about unnoticed relationships or peculiarities 
in our context. With regard to this piece of research, the ‘spillover effects’ can be exemplarily mentioned 
here, which seemed to influence perceived dependencies. Since it is most likely that outside the IS domain 
also embedded, multiple relationships between same exchange partners exist, our findings suggest to pay 
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more attention to potential spillovers in general. Furthermore, we would argue that the IS domain’s 
inherent distinction from other domains in terms of market structures and exchange of digital instead of 
physical goods, generally turns it into an interesting and different field of inter-organizational dependence 
research.  
While this paper focused on the firm level to investigate inter-firm dependence, future research could also 
adopt an embedded view, applying social theories (e.g., social exchange theory, social capital theory) on 
the individual level and theorizing how these impact in turn inter-firm dependencies. Since also medium-
to-high values of supplier dependence were partially observed, a detailed conceptualization of the supplier 
side could further add to our understanding of dependencies. 
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